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REMEDIES SYMPOSIUM 
ON CRITICAL JUNCTURES, INTERCURRENCE, AND
DYNAMIC POLITICAL ORDERS 
Paul Baumgardner∗ 
Over the past two decades, national and state governments have 
struggled to find suitable remedies for harms perpetrated against religious 
adherents and institutions, as well as harms perpetrated by religious 
adherents and institutions. At the core of these fights surrounding the Free 
Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment of the 
Constitution, the national Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) 
and state RFRAs are legitimate questions about the status of religious 
rights in the twenty-first century, the limiting principles on religious 
rights, and the types of political frameworks available for balancing 
religious rights and other valued individual and collective rights. 
To address these complex questions, judges and scholars should 
investigate several larger developments in American politics, most 
notably the dynamics that are reconstructing our nation’s church-state 
order. A wise first step in this investigation would be to track the various 
judicial, legislative, and social movement actions of the past several 
decades that implicate and contest the myriad forms of religious authority, 
right, and privilege in the United States. This step promises to supply a 
useful lens for evaluating the diverse, interwoven, and confrontational 
harms, claims, and liberty interests within our church-state order, while 
also helping to make sense of the controversies that will likely surround 
religious rights statutes and court cases in the future. 
This article represents an initial theoretical sketch of such an 
investigative step. Although introductory by nature, this piece promises to 
initiate a longer and richer empirical undertaking, one in which greater 
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attention will be paid to the sociological detail and lived texture of these 
broad, developmental accounts.1 
Relying on contemporary historical-institutionalist literature 
concerning processes of American political development, I argue that the 
nebulous status of religious rights is largely a recent phenomenon—the 
result of one coalition (centered around rights protections for the LGBTQ 
community) growing and making important strides at the same time that 
a separate “religious rights” coalition attempts to push beyond a 
disorienting critical juncture. 
I. CRITICAL JUNCTURES 
To understand the political challenges (and minefields of potential 
legal harms) surrounding religious rights in the twenty-first century, let’s 
first begin in 1963. In that year, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Sherbert 
v. Verner that the state could not substantially burden Adell Sherbert’s
free exercise of religion unless it proved that there was a compelling 
interest justifying the burden and that the state was applying the least 
restrictive means in achieving its compelling interest.2 The test developed 
in this case—the Sherbert test—stood for decades as the touchstone for 
cases pertaining to the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion. 
The Sherbert test aspired to find a balance between government interests 
and citizens’ religious freedom. The history of the Sherbert test 
demonstrates how hard federal courts worked to apply the test 
evenhandedly, so that neither the state nor religious adherents were 
structurally disadvantaged by its application.3 
However, nearly three decades later, the applicability and reach of 
Sherbert was drastically circumscribed. In Employment Division, 
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, the Supreme Court 
constructed a separate test for adjudicating religious free exercise cases.4 
Instead of asking whether the Native American claimants in the case had 
1. For instance, in the statutes and cases explored in this article, the number of parties ex-
pressing liberty interests, claiming to have been harmed, and/or expecting future harm are legion, 
including religious adherents, religious institutions, women, members of the LGBTQ community, 
non-religious citizens, and several states. Further research, on the basis of this article, plans to intro-
duce the valuable and discrete offerings of these different political actors.  
2. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
3. Amy Adamczyk, John Wybraniec, & Roger Finke, Religious Regulation and the Court:
Documenting the Effects of Smith and RFRA, 46 J. OF CHURCH AND ST. 237-62 (2004); MARTHA C. 
NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA’S TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS 
EQUALITY (2008). 
4. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
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been burdened by the relevant Oregon state law, the Court deemed other 
queries to be more constitutionally germane. If a burden had existed, it 
would then need to be determined whether the state had a compelling 
interest justifying the burden and had employed narrowly tailored means 
in achieving its interest. For instance, is the state law neutral and generally 
applicable? If so, the Court reasoned, then it usually will pass 
constitutional muster.5 
Smith showcased a critical juncture within the church-state order of 
the United States. As historical-institutional political scientists such as 
Giovanni Capoccia and R. Daniel Kelemen have argued, critical junctures 
are rare occurrences within political development. These large 
institutional disruptions produce several significant outcomes, namely: 
The range of plausible choices open to powerful political actors expands 
substantially and the consequences of their decisions for the outcome of 
interest are potentially much more momentous. Contingency, in other 
words, becomes paramount.6 
The Supreme Court’s actions in Smith surprised many legal 
observers because it profoundly changed the church-state order in the 
United States. Moments of abrasion and disagreement between religious 
entities and state entities have always pervaded American life, but the 
Smith decision was distinct. The ruling promulgated a foreign set of 
principles for negotiating instances of church-state conflict. Smith’s 
reinterpretation of the Free Exercise Clause represented a fundamental 
reworking of the constitutional standards, rights expectations, and 
claimant positions surrounding religious exercise. Whereas under the 
Sherbert test, the onus was on the state to explain and justify its acts once 
a burden on religious exercise was uncovered, the Smith test flipped the 
script. Under the new general applicability test, it was incumbent on 
religious adherents to demonstrate how a government act was biased or 
applied unequally to a particular religious exercise or exerciser. It was 
only when such a high threshold of bias and unequal treatment was found 
5. Id. at 881 (arguing that only a unique, hybridized religious rights claim could bring the
constitutional scope of a neutral and generally applicable law into question) (“The only decisions in 
which this Court has held that the First Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally applicable 
law to religiously motivated action are distinguished on the ground that they have involved not the 
Free Exercise Clause alone, but that Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections.”). 
6. Giovanni Capoccia and R. Daniel Kelemen, THE STUDY OF CRITICAL JUNCTURES: 
THEORY, NARRATIVE, AND COUNTERFACTUALS IN HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM, 59 WORLD 
POLITICS 341, 343 (2007); See also PAUL PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME: HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS, AND 
SOCIAL ANALYSIS (2004).  
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that the Sherbert test would be triggered and investigation into the 
compelling interest of the state would commence.7 
Incidentally, the critical juncture facing the church-state order in the 
United States also was visible in the increasingly unsettled area of 
Establishment Clause case law. What did and did not qualify as 
“respecting an establishment of religion” became an unnavigable morass. 
According to the U.S. Supreme Court, a standalone nativity scene in a 
county courthouse was unconstitutional, but a large menorah set next to a 
Christmas tree was constitutional.8 A Christian group using public school 
property for proselytism, hymn singing, and religious events was 
acceptable, but a short, non-denominational benediction given at a public 
high school graduation was beyond the pale.9 A student reading a prayer 
before a public high school football violated the Establishment Clause, 
but a chaplain opening municipal meetings with a prayer did not.10 And, 
for good measure, what of the Decalogue? Well, that depended on 
whether the Commandments were etched into a massive granite 
monument on the grounds of a state capitol (constitutional) or were one 
part of a multifarious exhibit at two county courthouses 
(unconstitutional).11 
During the exact same period in which Smith was jeopardizing the 
status quo of religious exercise, the Supreme Court provided mixed 
signals to lower courts and laymen alike on the matter of religious 
establishment. The Justices could not agree on the relevant political 
principles or legal standards motivating their decision-making: How much 
should we, as a nation, venerate strict separation between church and 
state? What about non-preferentialism between religious groups? Or 
religious accommodation? Did the First Amendment outline a 
constitutional duty to eradicate forms of religious coercion? Or did the 
Constitution only bar state endorsement of religion? And did the setting, 
audience, or history of a practice change the constitutional calculus? The 
Court vacillated, leaving the boundaries of religious rights uncertain. 
Remarkably, this critical juncture did not transition quickly or easily 
into a clear, determinate, or path-dependent settlement within America’s 
7. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
8. Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
9. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S.
577 (1992). 
10. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000); Town of Greece, N.Y. v. Galloway,
134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014). 
11. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005); McCreary Cty., Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 
844 (2005). 
2018] CRITICAL JUNCTURES 69 
church-state order. The Smith decision was met with resounding 
contempt, both in civil society and in the halls of government. A bipartisan 
Congress aimed to codify this constitutional backlash in the form of the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993. The explicit purpose behind 
this statute was to return to the church-state order of the pre-Smith period. 
This was to be accomplished by reestablishing the Sherbert test as the 
operative standard for “all cases where free exercise of religion is 
substantially burdened.”12 Passed with an overwhelming degree of 
support in both houses of Congress and then signed into law by President 
Clinton, this national RFRA effectively swooped in to unsettle Smith and 
reassert the Sherbert test as the standard that “applies to all Federal law, 
and the implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise.”13 
However, the RFRA was not on the books for four years before the 
Supreme Court sharply limited the scope of the statute. In City of Boerne 
v. Flores, the Supreme Court ruled that the RFRA did not apply to state
and local governments.14 In response, dozens of states spearheaded efforts 
to apply the Sherbert test to the states, oftentimes through legislative 
proposals to implement their own state RFRAs.15 
Throughout this order indeterminacy, one distinct legal 
consciousness has emerged, intent on entrenching a particular agenda and 
rights regime.16 This legal consciousness is animated by a commitment to 
12. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1993). 
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–3 (1993). 
14. Cty. of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
15. To date, at least 21 states have passed state RFRAs. See, National Conference of State
Legislatures, State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts (May 4, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/re-
search/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfra-statutes.aspx [https://perma.cc/6LZN-GUGG].  
16. By legal consciousness, I mean to connote the phenomenological character of the law in 
relation to the legal subject, namely, the orientation one has both when imagining and experiencing 
the present legal system and examining future constructions of that system. As sociologists Patricia 
Ewick and Susan S. Silbey explain, legal consciousness concerns the “patterned, stabilized, and ob-
jectified” set of legal “meanings” that constitute and make sense of the law. PATRICIA EWICK & 
SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE 39 (1998). Accord-
ing to Ewick and Silbey:  
In this theoretical framing of legal consciousness as participation in the construction of 
legality, consciousness is not an exclusively ideational, abstract, or decontextualized set 
of attitudes toward and about the law. Consciousness is not merely a state of mind. Legal 
consciousness is produced and revealed in what people do as well as what they say. In this 
sense, consciousness is . . . constituted and expressed in the practical knowledge individ-
uals have of social life. Consciousness is discursively deployed as reflexive consideration 
about day-to-day activities; it is also tacitly enacted as competent social action. 
Id. at 46; see also Paul Baumgardner, Kennedy, Consciousness, and the Monostructural Account of 
the American Legal Order, UNBOUND: HARV. J. OF THE LEGAL LEFT, Vol. X (2015); Erik D. 
Fritsvold, Under the Law: Legal Consciousness and Radical Environmental Activism, 34 L. & SOC. 
INQUIRY Issue 4 (Fall 2009). 
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a robust right to free exercise, which entails limited government 
interference in religious practices and heightened deference to the dictates 
of conscience and the prerogatives of religious institutions. Relatedly, this 
consciousness champions a less-than-robust Establishment Clause, in the 
name of maintaining the cultural importance of visible religion. 
According to this consciousness, religion—equipped with its language, 
symbols, and other material trappings—should be allowed a conspicuous 
and salutary presence in American life. 
It would be fair to argue that this consciousness has united and driven 
a nebulous coalition of religious adherents, institutions, conservative 
interest groups, and activists. If this particular legal consciousness is not 
sufficiently institutionalized—which, at the very least, indicates 
translation into the laws, legal practices, and judicial standards 
surrounding religious free exercise and religious establishment—the 
coalition worries that religious adherents and institutions will be 
susceptible to extensive political harm. For this reason, the coalition has 
become an active presence in American law and politics. It has played an 
instrumental role in lobbying and litigation efforts surrounding the 
national and state RFRAs, and coalition forces also have been at the 
forefront of defending the public role of religion in American life.17 
II. INTERCURRENCE
Since Smith was handed down in 1990, exposing and broadening a 
rift in the church-state order within this country, other key political orders 
within the United States have experienced separate (yet, as we will see, 
deeply connected) developments. One of the most significant order 
developments concerns the recognition and expansion of constitutional 
rights for members of the LGBTQ community. 
Thirty-two years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court found Georgia’s 
sodomy laws to be constitutionally valid.18 Since that time, however, a 
legal consciousness related to the protection of LGBTQ rights has formed 
in the United States. This consciousness has stressed the manners in which 
virtues of fairness, equality, justice, toleration, and compassion demand a 
reconsideration of the rights afforded to members of the LGBTQ 
community. Numerous legal and political science scholars have detailed 
the changing public attitudes surrounding the LGBTQ community, 
17. See ANDREW R. LEWIS, THE RIGHTS TURN IN CONSERVATIVE CHRISTIAN POLITICS: HOW 
ABORTION TRANSFORMED THE CULTURE WARS (2017). 
18. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
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including the courthouse victories for the community. However, little 
attention has been paid to the legal consciousness behind these recent 
rights recognitions or to the manner in which this legal consciousness has 
interacted with and grated against other legal consciousnesses in the 
United States. During the exact same period in which (1) Smith and 
Sherbert redux were seesawing, (2) Free Exercise Clause and 
Establishment Clause interpretations were shifting, (3) RFRAs began to 
be debated at the national and state levels, and (4) the general state of the 
church-state order in America was up in the air, the progressive legal 
consciousness surrounding LGBTQ rights grew and started making 
landmark strides. 
Lest all this talk of critical junctures, consciousnesses, and orders has 
come across as an unduly abstract presentation of contemporary American 
political developments, let’s reground these radical evolutions. It is 
essential to keep in mind how both of these legal consciousnesses 
bubbling up from the 1990s to the present have been promulgated, 
developed, and enacted by diverse coalitions and support structures. In the 
same way that religious rights forces have mobilized in the wake of Smith, 
it has demanded an incredible amount of time, money, manpower, legal 
aid, and movement strength to take down state sodomy laws, unsettle the 
Defense of Marriage Act, advance the state and national cases for same-
sex marriage, and craft anti-discrimination statutes through multiple 
institutional avenues.19 
Some might argue that the most fascinating feature of these 
concurrent order developments relates to the radical contingency and 
inessential antagonism involved in the meeting of these opposing 
movement forces. These coalitions originally were motivated by legal 
consciousnesses not intrinsically in competition or even directly oriented 
towards the same universe of legal harms. However, it is important to note 
how these two different coalitions—each equipped with disparate support 
structures and united by discrete legal consciousnesses (which themselves 
were directed towards dissimilar rights regimes)—were in the process of 
reconstructing independent yet historically proximate orders.20 
19. NATHANIEL FRANK, AWAKENING: HOW GAYS AND LESBIANS BROUGHT MARRIAGE
EQUALITY TO AMERICA (2017); JO BECKER, FORCING THE SPRING: INSIDE THE FIGHT FOR MARRIAGE 
EQUALITY (2014); Thomas M. Keck, Beyond Backlash: Assessing the Impact of Judicial Decisions 
on LGBT Rights, 43 L. & SOC. REV., 1 (2009); CHARLES EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, 
ACTIVISTS, AND SUPREME COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1998). 
20. Through a rich combination of (1) a motivating legal consciousness (linked to a particularly 
privileged rights regime), (2) coalitional strength, and (3) a support structure that enabled mobiliza-
tion, these forces sought to reconstruct their respective political orders. 
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The dynamic workings of these two different coalitions have 
generated a state of intercurrence between the church-state order (which 
was the chief target of influence for the religious rights coalition) and the 
politico-sexual order (which was the chief target of influence for the 
LGBTQ coalition). In short, as these two coalitions have influenced their 
respective political orders over the past several decades, the developing 
church-state order and politico-sexual order have themselves exerted 
immense, contrasting pressure on one another.21 
In their classic work of historical-institutionalist scholarship, The 
Search for American Political Development, political scientists Karen 
Orren and Stephen Skowronek describe the confrontational character of 
such intercurrence: 
Intercurrence depicts the organization of the polity seen strictly from a 
historical institutional point of view. It directs researchers to locate the 
historical construction of politics in the simultaneous operation of older 
and newer instruments of governance, in controls asserted through mul-
tiple orderings of authority whose coordination with one another cannot 
be assumed and whose outward reach and impingements, including on 
one another, are inherently problematic.22 
The activities of the religious rights coalition and the LGBTQ 
coalition since 1990 have led to a dialectic between the American church-
state order and the American politico-sexual order on various institutional 
fronts, and these orders continue to collide in the most acrimonious of 
ways, constructing—along the way—uncharted and unclear frontiers of 
legal harm and remedy. 
Many of these dialectical encounters have been designed quite 
consciously. Into the early 2010s, although state RFRAs were getting 
passed (generally with bipartisan support), some of the most attention-
grabbing efforts by the religious rights coalition to procure remedies for 
21. In Institutions and Intercurrence: Theory Building In The Fullness Of Time, Karen Orren
And Stephen Skowronek outline how this phenomenon of intercurrence will include: 
Replacing the expectation of an ordered space bounded in synchronized time with the ex-
pectation of a politicized push and pull arrayed around multiple institutional arrangements 
with diverse historical origins. With this image of the political universe in view, attention 
is directed to the ways in which different ordering principles converge, collide, and fold 
onto one another. 
Karen Orren & Stephen Skowronek, Institutions and Intercurrence: Theory Building In The Fullness 
Of Time, 38 NOMOS 138 (1996). 
22. KAREN ORREN & STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE SEARCH FOR AMERICAN POLITICAL 
DEVELOPMENT 113 (2004). 
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violations of statutory and constitutional religious rights included issues 
perceived as threatening to the LGBTQ coalition. When the Christian 
Legal Society tried to become a university-sanctioned student 
organization at the University of California, Hastings College of Law, it 
was rejected on the grounds that the Society was discriminatory towards 
LGBTQ students.23 The Christian Legal Society sued the school, and by 
the time the case had wormed its way to the U.S. Supreme Court, both the 
religious rights coalition and the LGBTQ coalition had lined up to support 
their respective sides. 
From the perspective of many active within or sympathetic to the 
LGBTQ coalition, it seems as if a large number of the purported advances 
in religious liberty have had the larger effect of safeguarding believers’ 
freedom to discriminate against traditionally marginalized persons. Two 
years after Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, a unanimous Supreme 
Court ruled that the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses protect 
religious institutions against employment discrimination lawsuits brought 
by their religious leaders and teachers (in this case, a disabled woman who 
occasionally taught religion courses at a Lutheran school).24 In 2014, the 
high court interpreted the national RFRA with such breadth that Hobby 
Lobby Stores are not legally required to supply basic contraceptive 
services to thousands of its female employees.25 A year later, a county 
clerk in Kentucky even relied on her religious beliefs to justify her refusal 
to sign marriage licenses for same-sex couples.26 The clerk, Kim Davis, 
remarked: “To issue a marriage license which conflicts with God’s 
definition of marriage, with my name affixed to the certificate, would 
violate my conscience . . . I have no animosity toward anyone and harbor 
no ill will. To me this has never been a gay or lesbian issue. It is about 
marriage and God’s word.”27 A dominant worry within the evolving 
23. See Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010). The Christian Legal Society’s
stated beliefs and mission were opposed to homosexuality and homosexual behavior, and the Society 
did not permit students who were living in opposition to the Society’s tenets to be active members. 
Id. 
24. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171 (2012). 
25. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); see also Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct.
1557 (2016). 
26. Eugene Volokh, When does your religion legally excuse you from doing part of your job?, 
WASH. POST (Sept. 4, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspir-
acy/wp/2015/09/04/when-does-your-religion-legally-excuse-you-from-doing-part-of-your-
job/?utm_term=.c3467b13b365 [https://perma.cc/3NUV-PFXZ].  
27. Alan Blinder & Richard Pérez-Peña, Kentucky Clerk Denies Same-Sex Marriage Licenses, 
Defying Court, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/02/us/same-sex-mar-
riage-kentucky-kim-davis.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/43XC-CJGQ].  
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American politico-sexual order is that the religious rights coalition is only 
interested in finding suitable remedies for harms perpetrated against 
religious adherents and institutions; the coalition is not concerned with 
avoiding harm to women, the disabled, or members of the LGBTQ 
community.28 
However, from the perspective of many active within or sympathetic 
to the religious rights coalition, the progressive legal consciousness 
surrounding LGBTQ rights has obtained a frightening degree of 
institutional recognition in the United States. Over the course of only 12 
years, anti-sodomy laws were struck down as unconstitutional,29 DOMA 
was eviscerated,30 California’s Proposition 8 was buried,31 multiple states 
elected to recognize same-sex marriage, and the U.S. Supreme Court ruled 
that the U.S. Constitution guaranteed the right of marriage to all same-sex 
couples across the country.32 A common view within the religious right 
coalition is that these recent constitutional gains for the LGBTQ 
community are ever expanding and even imperialistic, effectively 
crowding out space for religious observance (particularly for faith 
communities that do not condone LGBTQ rights, identities, behaviors, 
practices, etc.). Moreover, legal protections for the LGBTQ community 
actually are forcing religious adherents into actions that they are 
religiously opposed to performing.33 As such, a dominant worry within 
the evolving American church-state order is that the LGBTQ coalition is 
only interested in finding suitable remedies for harms perpetrated against 
the LGBTQ community; the coalition is not concerned with avoiding 
harm to the rights, beliefs, and practices of religious adherents and 
institutions. 
III. MOVING FORWARD?
Although it would be unnecessarily apocalyptic to claim that the 
intercurrence between these two political orders has reached a legal zero-
sum point—where one order is demonstrably harmed by each gain 
enjoyed by the other order—the rhetoric surrounding present legal 
28. See, e.g., Ed O’Keefe, Gay rights groups withdraw support of ENDA after Hobby Lobby 
decision, WASH. POST (July 8, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-poli-
tics/wp/2014/07/08/gay-rights-group-withdrawing-support-of-enda-after-hobby-lobby-deci-
sion/?utm_term=.b746e0136790 [http://perma.cc/G54T-YJA9]. 
29. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
30. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013). 
31. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693 (2013). 
32. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
33. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017). 
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struggles for religious rights and LGBTQ rights certainly could lead a 
casual observer to this conclusion. 
A clear example of this concerns the fate of RFRAs. Whereas the 
national RFRA and numerous state RFRA proposals received widespread 
support from both parties just a few years ago, more recent efforts to pass 
state laws protecting religious rights have generated marked partisan 
divisions and intense public scrutiny. When Indiana passed a common 
model RFRA in 2015, a groundswell of opposition developed from the 
LGBTQ coalition, as well as from corporations, celebrities, and everyday 
Americans. Boycotts and protests escalated until additional legislation 
assuaged critics. Later attempts to pass state RFRAs in Arkansas, Georgia, 
and North Carolina were equally contentious. Seen as offering legal cover 
for bigotry, hatred, and discrimination, RFRAs and similar protective 
legislation are now regularly talked about as anti-LGBTQ legislation and 
government permissions to victimize.34 At least one state has gone so far 
as to take the fight to states with RFRAs. In 2016, California elected to 
ban state-supported travel to “states that California believes don’t protect 
religious freedoms and states that it says use religious freedom as a basis 
of discrimination.”35 
IV.CONCLUSION
The best mechanism for resolving the intercurrence between the 
church-state order desired by the religious rights coalition and the 
politico-sexual order desired by the LGBTQ coalition is yet to be 
discovered. However, much hangs in the balance. If Smith showcased a 
critical juncture within the church-state order, the state of religious liberty 
appears just as blurry in the wake of religious liberty protection laws 
becoming unpopular and legally suspect. Similarly, the LGBTQ coalition 
has brought attention to the legal inconsistencies and uncertainties that 
continue to affect the LGBTQ community. This includes, but clearly is 
not limited to, the proper scope of federal and state anti-discrimination 
34. See, e.g., Terri R. Day & Danielle Weatherby, LGBT Rights and the Mini RFRA: A Return 
to Separate but Equal, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 907 (2016); Lucien J. Dhooge, The Impact of State Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Acts: An Analysis of the Interpretive Case Law, 52 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
585 (2017); Jennifer Finney Boylan, The Masterpiece Cakeshop Case Is Not About Religious Free-
dom, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/29/opinion/gay-religious-free-
dom-cake.html [http://perma.cc/VC5Z-K5KD]. 
35. Carma Hassan, California adds 4 states to travel ban for laws it says discriminate against 
LGBTQ community, CNN (June 23, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/23/us/california-travel-
ban/index.html [https://perma.cc/C24Z-CE5N]; S. Con. Res. 1887, 2015 Gen. Assemb,, Reg. Sess. 
(Cal. 2016).  
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laws in the areas of housing, employment, adoption, public 
accommodations, and education. 
It is possible that the church-state order and the politico-sexual order 
will naturally move out of intercurrence. The religious rights coalition 
might fade, morph, and/or become less influential within the church-state 
order. The same goes for the LGBTQ coalition as it relates to the politico-
sexual order. But what if the intercurrence does not go the way of 
spontaneous, harmonious reordering. What if the different histories, 
agendas, logics, actors, rights regimes, and authority structures within 
these orders do not resolve themselves? 
Should we then defer to the vicissitudes of a shifting federal 
judiciary? Do the top-down remedies flowing from Supreme Court and 
lower court decisions even possess the requisite reconciliatory powers for 
these orders? Another option would be to entrust the wheels of federalism 
with the elimination of any intercurrence harms, or at least to equally 
appreciate the competing orders. But do we want different state 
authorities—each endowed with unique, local political priorities—to be 
responsible for gradually shaping the legal compromises and relative 
powers of the church-state order and the politico-sexual order? 
Most likely, the explosive intercurrence that we have witnessed 
between the church-state order and the politico-sexual order dominant in 
the United States is going to have to be directly untangled through a series 
of forceful, purposive legal measures. The law has been a substantial force 
in restructuring the American church-state order and the politico-sexual 
order since 1990 (and certainly well before that). The law should prove to 
be a substantial force in future construction as well. But what 
constructions will be made and how they will become path dependent are 
highly contingent, which seems to augur a continuation of mobilizations 
and confrontations from religious rights and LGBTQ coalitions, each 
angling to be the authors of the salvific legal measures. 
